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MILITARY COMMISSIONS: A PLACE OUTSIDE THE LAW’S 
REACH 
JANET COOPER ALEXANDER* 
“We have turned our backs on the law and created what we believed was a 
place outside the law’s reach.”1 
Ten years after 9/11, it is hard to remember that the decision to treat the 
attacks as the trigger for taking the country to a state of war was not inevitable.  
Previous acts of terrorism had been investigated and prosecuted as crimes, 
even when they were carried out or planned by al Qaeda.2  But on September 
12, 2001, President Bush pronounced the attacks “acts of war,”3 and he 
 
* Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.  I would like to thank 
participants at the 2011 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at Saint Louis University School 
of Law and a Stanford Law School faculty workshop for their comments, and Nicolas Martinez 
for invaluable research assistance. 
 1. Ed Vulliamy, Ten Years On, Former Chief Prosecutor at Guantanamo Slams ‘Camp of 
Torture’, OBSERVER, Oct. 30, 2011, at 29 (quoting Colonel Morris D. Davis, former chief 
prosecutor of the Guantánamo military commissions). 
 2. Previous al Qaeda attacks that were prosecuted as crimes include the 1993 bombing of 
the World Trade Center, the Manila Air (or Bojinka) plot to blow up a dozen jumbo jets, and the 
1998 embassy bombings in East Africa.  Mary Jo White, Prosecuting Terrorism in New York, 
MIDDLE E.Q., Spring 2001, at 11, 11–14; see also Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Jury Convicts 3 in a 
Conspiracy to Bomb Airliners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at A1.  Other attacks, such as aircraft 
hijackings and bombings carried out by agents of the Libyan government, including the bombing 
of Pan Am 103, were also treated as crimes.  Colin Boyd, Workshop: Police Investigations of 
“Politically Sensitive” or High Profile Crimes: The Lockerbie Trial, INT’L SOC’Y FOR REFORM 
CRIM. L., 2–3, 5 (Aug. 28, 2001), http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Boyd.pdf.  Even during the Bush 
presidency, the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa were prosecuted as crimes in U.S. 
courts.  Benjamin Weiser, 4 Guilty in Terror Bombings of 2 U.S. Embassies in Africa; Jury to 
Weigh 2 Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at A1. 
 3. “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country 
were more than acts of terror.  They were acts of war. . . .  Freedom and democracy are under 
attack. . . .  But make no mistake about it: We will win.”  Remarks Following a Meeting With the 
National Security Team, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1100 (Sept. 12, 2001).  In a radio address on September 
11, 2001, the President had not gone so far, referring to the attacks as “acts of mass murder” and 
saying that “our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and 
deadly terrorist acts.”  Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks 2 PUB. PAPERS, 1099 (Sept. 
11, 2001). 
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repeatedly defined himself as a “war president.”4  The war paradigm reflected 
and reinforced core policy dispositions of the Bush Administration—the 
commitment to expanding presidential power, the conviction that the 
president’s authority in military affairs should not be constrained by law, and 
the desire to create a legacy as a great president, together with the belief that 
the great presidents have tended to be “war presidents.” 
President Obama campaigned on the very different paradigm of the rule of 
law. He pledged to eliminate reliance on novel theories of executive power, 
avoidance of existing legal constraints, and the use of new procedures, such as 
military commissions, to deny rights to suspected terrorists in order to make it 
easier to imprison and convict them.5  On his first day in office he suspended 
the military commissions.6  He and Attorney General Holder repeatedly 
stressed their determination to abide by the rule of law and to try top suspected 
terrorists, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in federal court.7 
Soon, however, Congress began using its spending power to place limits 
on the President’s ability to close down the military commissions or the 
detention center at Guantánamo.  As of now, Congress seems to have 
completely foreclosed the possibility of criminal prosecution of anyone who is 
held at Guantánamo, despite strong objections from the Pentagon, the Justice 
Department, the FBI, and the CIA.  Of necessity, military commission 
proceedings have resumed.  But the Obama Administration has not given up on 
its preference for criminal prosecutions.  It has managed to bring a number of 
new criminal prosecutions of international terrorists captured abroad, and to 
win some important concessions in legislation originally designed to require all 
suspected terrorists to be held in military custody and tried by military 
tribunals. 
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the use and justification of military 
commissions under the Bush-era war paradigm.  Part II discusses the evolution 
from the Bush vision of military commissions as outside the law’s reach to the 
Obama Administration’s attempt to reinstate the rule of law in detainee policy 
and to close the military commissions; that Part also examines congressional 
legislation using the spending power to force cases out of the federal courts 
 
 4. “I’m a war president.  I make decisions here in the Oval Office in foreign-policy matters 
with war on my mind.”  Meet the Press with Tim Russert: Interview with President George W. 
Bush (NBC television broadcast Feb. 8, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/4179618/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-feb-th/#.Ty142cVSQ7s). 
 5. Sen. Barack Obama, Remarks at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.: The War We 
Need To Win (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/08/the_ 
war_we_need_to_win.html). 
 6. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 203, 206 (2010). 
 7. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, U.S. To Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Savage, U.S. To Try Avowed 9/11 
Mastermind]. 
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and into military tribunals in order to prevent recognition of procedural rights 
for detainees.  Parts III and IV discuss two enduring flaws of the military 
commission system under both President Bush and President Obama: first, 
their jurisdiction has consisted almost exclusively of offenses that are not 
triable to military commissions, and thus they are illegal under U.S. and 
international law; second, there is a lack of legal standards for assigning 
particular detainees to criminal prosecution, military commissions, or 
indefinite detention without charge.  I close with some tentative conclusions 
about where we are likely to go in the near term.  The current Administration 
will likely attempt to avoid bringing any more individuals to Guantánamo and 
will still endeavor to try new suspects in federal court rather than before 
military commissions.  But because the commissions continue to be 
fundamentally flawed and the agenda of reinstating the rule of law in detainee 
policy is embodied in nothing more permanent than executive orders (with the 
exception of improved procedures for military commission trials), military 
commissions are likely to persist, and to continue to be “outside the law’s 
reach.”8 
I.  MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE WAR PARADIGM 
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush took a number of 
actions to expand executive power to use military force, gather intelligence, 
and detain and punish suspected terrorists free of any legal constraints or 
interference by the other branches of government.  Within a few months of the 
attacks, he declared that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to suspected 
terrorists captured in Afghanistan or elsewhere,9 established military 
 
 8. Vulliamy, supra note 1. 
 9. The decision is referred to in Attorney General Gonzales’s memo to the President, 
Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to George W. Bush, U.S. President, Decision re 
Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban 1 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/ 
02.01.25.pdf, which followed Office of Legal Counsel opinions including Memorandum from Jay 
S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Re: Application of 
Treaties and Laws to Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees 1 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at 
www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf; Memorandum from John Yoo, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, 
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees 1 (Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo Treaties and Laws Memo], available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf.  In response to criticism, 
and despite Gonzales’s advice in the January twenty-fifth memo, Bush reversed this decision as 
to the Taliban, though not to al Qaeda.  Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit 
Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1. 
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commissions by executive order to try them,10 and began bringing them to 
Guantánamo Naval Base and other locations outside the United States—where, 
the Administration claimed, the Constitution and laws did not apply—for 
indefinite detention without charge.11  The Bush Administration detained 
thousands of people within the United States outside the criminal process 
through misuse of material witness warrants and immigration proceedings,12 
and began a program of secret electronic surveillance within the United 
States.13  In short, the Administration sought to create a law-free zone in which 
it could do whatever it chose. 
As part of the law-free zone strategy, the Bush Administration sought to 
bypass the courts by creating new tribunals that would be under the control of 
the executive branch and exempt from constitutional constraints.  
Characterizing the attacks as “war” did not necessarily require the creation of 
new courts.  Military commissions had not been used in more than half a 
century—not in Korea, Vietnam, the First Gulf War, nor other contexts 
involving military forces, such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings.14  All of 
the acts that have been charged as military commission offenses are crimes 
under the U.S. Code and could be prosecuted as such.15  Those captured on the 
battlefield could have been treated as prisoners of war (“POW”s) and either 
 
 10. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). 
 11. David Cole, Enemy Aliens and American Freedoms, NATION, Sept. 23, 2002, at 20, 22 
(noting that the Bush Administration detained “suspected terrorists” without charge and claimed 
the President was authorized to enforce indefinite incarceration without judicial review); Neil A. 
Lewis, Disagreement Over Detainees’ Legal Rights Simmers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A15 
(indicating that the Administration’s position remained unchanged—the “notion that the U.S. 
Constitution affords due process and other rights to enemy aliens captured abroad and confined 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States is contrary to law and history”). 
 12. Bradley A. Parker, Abuse of the Material Witness: Suspects Detained as Witnesses in 
Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 22, 22–23, 25–26 (2009), http://lawrec 
ord.com/files/36_Rutgers_L_Rec_22.pdf. 
 13. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 14. See Military Commissions History, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/A 
BOUTUS/MilitaryCommissionsHistory.aspx (last visited May 8, 2012) (indicating that Military 
Commissions had not been used in the United States after World War II until 9/11). 
 15. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to Sen. Mitch McConnell (Feb. 3, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/ag-letter-2-3-10.pdf (arguing that the criminal 
justice system is a valuable national security tool that should not be taken off the table in pursuing 
terrorism threats); Laura Pitter, Guantanamo’s System of Injustice, SALON (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/19/Guantanamos_system_of_injustice/singleton/ (asserting that 
the United States does not need the military commissions system because detainees can be 
prosecuted in federal courts for “virtually the same offenses”). 
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detained under the laws of war or tried before courts-martial for war crimes,16 
or if they were not entitled to POW status they could have been tried under the 
domestic law of the place of their capture or conduct.  The Bush 
Administration, however, did not want to be constrained by any law in dealing 
with detainees and did not want to dignify terrorists by recognizing them as 
POWs.17  Furthermore, creating special new courts under military authority 
served to emphasize that the country was on a war footing. 
The executive order authorizing trials by military commission came quite 
early on, suggesting that the commissions were expected to play an important 
role in the response to the attacks.  On November 13, 2001, President Bush 
issued an executive order authorizing the creation of military tribunals as the 
exclusive means of trying suspected international terrorists.18  A Defense 
Department order prescribing the procedures for military commissions was 
issued in March 2002.19  But the list of crimes that could be charged was not 
promulgated until 2003,20 and no one was charged until 2004.21  Instead, high-
profile suspected international terrorists were prosecuted in federal court.22 
Within two months of the executive order decreeing that suspected 
terrorists should be tried exclusively in military commissions, three high-
profile criminal prosecutions of alleged al Qaeda or Taliban members were 
brought in federal court.  Zacharias Moussaoui, a French citizen who was 
already in a U.S. jail on 9/11, was alleged to have been scheduled to replace 
the original twentieth hijacker.23  Moussaoui was indicted on December 11, 
2001, went through lengthy trial proceedings, and pleaded guilty in March 
2005.24  He was sentenced to six consecutive life terms.25  John Walker Lindh, 
an American citizen who was captured in Afghanistan in November 2001 after 
 
 16. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 4, 99–108, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 17. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to George W. Bush, supra note 9. 
 18. Military Order of November 13, 2001, supra note 10, §§ 2, 4. 
 19. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military Comm’n Order No. 1 § 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter 
MCO], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf. 
 20. U.S Dep’t of Def., Military Comm’n Instruction No. 2 (Apr. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/May2003/d20030430milcominstno2.pdf. 
 21. Neil A. Lewis, First War-Crimes Case Opens at Guantánamo Base, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2004, at A14. 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
Moussaoui’s convictions and sentences for life imprisonment for his conspiracy to commit 
terrorist attacks, including the 9/11 attacks). 
 23. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 266, 273. 
 24. Id. at 266–71.  In 2006, Moussaoui was sentenced to life in prison, id. at 277–78, which 
he is serving at the supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.  Carrie Johnson & Walter Pincus, 
Supermax Prisons in U.S. Already Hold Terrorists, WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, at A6. 
 25. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 277–78.  Moussaoui was tried in the Eastern District of Virginia.  
See id. at 300. 
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a firefight with Taliban forces, was interrogated in Afghanistan and on 
shipboard until the end of January 2002, at which point he was brought directly 
to the United States for indictment and trial.26  He pleaded guilty in July 2002, 
in exchange for a sentence of twenty years.27  British citizen Richard Reid, the 
“shoe bomber,” was arrested in December 2001 after the plane he was trying to 
bomb over international waters was diverted to Boston, was charged with 
federal crimes, pleaded guilty in October 2002, and was sentenced to three life 
sentences without possibility of parole, to be served consecutively.28 
Hundreds of defendants have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes in 
federal court since 9/11 and have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms,29 
which they are serving in supermax prisons under draconian conditions.30  In 
contrast, only three persons were convicted by military commissions during the 
Bush Administration.31  Only one of these was convicted after an adversary 
 
 26. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545–47 (E.D. Va. 2002); Duncan Campbell 
& Richard Norton-Taylor, Prison Ships, Torture Claims, and Missing Detainees, GUARDIAN, 
(June 1, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/02/terrorism.terrorism.  Lindh was 
also prosecuted in the Eastern District of Virginia.  Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
 27. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566, 572 (E.D. Va. 2002).  The plea bargain 
was offered just before a scheduled hearing on a motion to suppress Lindh’s confession for being 
obtained under torture.  See Dave Lindorff, Chertoff and Torture, NATION, Feb. 14, 2005, at 6, 6.  
Lindh had been shot in the leg, went without medical attention for more than two weeks, and was 
given morphine before the interview in which he confessed.  Frank Lindh, America’s ‘Detainee 
001’—The Persecution of John Walker Lindh, OBSERVER (July 9, 2011), http://www.guard 
ian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/10/john-walker-lindh-american-taliban-father; see also Scott Horton, 
Traitor: Six Questions for Jesselyn Radack, HARPER’S MAG. (June 1, 2012), http://www.harpers. 
org/archive/2012/06/hbc-90008642 (describing Justice Department attorney Radack’s advice that 
Lindh could not be questioned because he was represented by counsel, the Justice Department’s 
concealment of this advice, and Radack’s whistleblower complaint which ultimately led to her 
dismissal).  He later attempted unsuccessfully to have his sentence reduced after Yasir Hamdi, 
among others, received much lower sentences.  Lindh Seeks Sentence Reduction, CNN (Sept. 28, 
2004), http://articles.cnn.com/2004-09-28/justice/lindh.commutation_1_taliban-american-yaser-
hamdi-john-walker-lindh?_s=PM:LAW.  His family’s pleas for clemency or pardon from 
Presidents Bush and Obama have not been granted.  Frank R. Lindh, Bin Laden’s Gone.  Can My 
Son Come Home?, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2011, at WK9; Father of a U.S. Taliban Fighter Speaks 
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A14 (reporting Lindh’s father sought clemency from President 
Bush). 
 28. Pam Belluck, Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Is Given a Life Sentence for Trying to Blow Up 
Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A13; Richard A. Serrano, ‘Shoe Bomber’ Reid Given 3 Life 
Terms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at 1. 
 29. David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 1, 14–16 (2011). 
 30. Johnson & Pincus, supra note 24. 
 31. This is not to suggest that criminal trials should be used because they result in higher 
conviction rates and harsher sentences.  Criminal trials are more fair, more legitimate, and more 
true to American principles—though the proliferation of new offenses such as providing material 
support for terrorism and the prevalence of harsh sentencing have made them less fair than 
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trial.  David Hicks agreed to a plea bargain under which he served nine 
additional months in Australia;32 Ali al-Bahlul boycotted his trial, instructing 
his lawyer not to put on a defense, and received a life sentence;33 and Salim 
Hamdan was convicted of only one count and received a sentence of sixty-six 
months, with credit for sixty-one months already served.34  Three more 
detainees charged during the Bush Administration have since pleaded guilty 
before military commissions.35 
From the beginning, the military commissions have had more symbolic 
value than practical effect.  The creation of special new tribunals confirmed 
that the country was “at war,” reinforced the idea that this was “a different type 
of war”36 in which old methods, old laws, and old legal constraints were 
inadequate, and gave assurance that the perpetrators would be treated harshly.  
Indeed, two recurring assumptions have persisted over the past decade: first, 
that the conviction rate and sentences would be higher in military commission 
proceedings than in criminal court because the commission proceedings would 
not follow the rules of evidence required in criminal prosecutions and would 
not have an independent judiciary, juries, or constitutional protections such as 
the right of confrontation, the right to counsel, and the requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and second, as Administration officials repeatedly 
 
before.  The record of terrorism prosecutions since 9/11 thoroughly refutes the argument that the 
criminal justice system cannot cope with terrorism trials. 
 32. William Glaberson, Australian to Serve Nine Months in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2007, at A10. 
 33. David J.R. Frakt, The Practice of Criminal Law in the Guantánamo Military 
Commissions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 35, 71–72, 85 (2011); Peter Finn, Guantanamo Jury Sentences Bin 
Laden Aide to Life Term, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2008, at A10. 
 34. William Glaberson, Panel Convicts bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
7, 2008, at A1; U.S. Sending a Convict Back to Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at A23. 
 35. These are Ibrahhim Ahmed al-Qosi, who pleaded guilty under a plea agreement 
providing all but two years of his sentence would be suspended, Charlie Savage, Guantánamo 
Detainee Pleads Guilty in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at A15 [hereinafter Savage, 
Guantánamo Detainee Pleads Guilty]; The Guantánamo Docket: Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al 
Qosi, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/54-ibrahim-ahmed-mah 
moud-al-qosi (last visited June 16, 2012); Omar Khadr, who pleaded guilty under an agreement 
that he would serve no more than eight years and could be transferred to Canada after one year, 
Charlie Savage, Delays Keep Former Qaeda Child Soldier at Guantánamo, Despite Plea Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012, at A24; and Noor Uthman Muhammed, who pleaded guilty under an 
agreement providing that he would serve no more than thirty-four months, The Guantánamo 
Docket: Noor Uthman Muhammed, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detain 
ees/707-noor-uthman-muhammed (last visited June 16, 2012). 
 36. Remarks to Employees in the Pentagon and an Exchange with Reporters in Arlington, 
Virginia, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1117, 1119–20 (Sept. 17, 2001) (“I know that an act of war was declared 
against America.  But this will be a different type of war than we’re used to. . . .  [T]his is a 
different type of enemy than we’re used to. . . .  [I]t’s a new type of war.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1122 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1115 
emphasized, that it would be both dangerous and offensive to give suspected 
terrorists the procedural protections of the regular courts. 
One reason for the Bush Administration’s failure to actually follow 
through with military commission trials may have been that the government 
could achieve the same goals without bothering with trials.  Until the summer 
of 2004, when the Supreme Court first held that due process and habeas 
protections applied to the war on terror,37 the Administration claimed the 
power to detain suspected terrorists of any nationality without charge 
anywhere in the world, including the United States.38  After the Supreme Court 
held that Guantánamo detainees had the right to habeas and to a review of the 
factual basis for their detention by a neutral tribunal,39 the Bush Administration 
attempted to circumvent judicial review by establishing Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) as an alternative procedure for reviewing the 
factual basis for detention.  CSRTs—composed of military personnel and 
largely devoid of procedural protections40—upheld the detention of virtually 
every Guantánamo prisoner.41  For “high-value detainees” who were thought to 
have greater intelligence value and on whom the Administration sought 
freedom to use “enhanced interrogation techniques,” the CIA continued to 
operate “black sites.”42 
 
 37. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509, 537–38 (2004). 
 38. See id. at 510–11 (considering the government’s argument that it could detain a U.S. 
citizen captured in Afghanistan indefinitely in a military brig within the United States); Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470, 485 (2004) (considering the government’s argument that it could detain 
foreign nationals designated as enemy combatants indefinitely at Guantánamo); Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430–32 (2004) (considering the government’s argument that by 
designating a U.S. citizen taken into custody within the United States as an “enemy combatant” it 
could detain him indefinitely in military custody within the United States); Janet Cooper 
Alexander, John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law Review and the World, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 331, 
334–37 (2012). 
 39. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483.  The Court later held that Guantánamo 
detainees had a constitutional, not merely a statutory, right to habeas.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
 40. See Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, to Sec’y of Def. et al., 
Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants 
Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Enclosure (1) (July 29, 2004), available at 
www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf. 
 41. Five hundred thirty-nine of the 581 reviews resulted in continued detention and 
classification as enemy combatants, a 92.7% rate of continued classification.  See Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal Summary, U.S. DEP’T DEF., http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsumma 
ry.pdf (last updated Feb. 10, 2009).  For further information, see Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals/Administrative Review Boards, U.S. DEP’T DEF., http://www.defense.gov/news/Com 
batant_Tribunals.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2007) 
 42. Jonathan Karl, ‘High-Value’ Detainees Transferred to Guantanamo, ABC NEWS (Sept. 
6, 2006), abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2400470#.TxsPXOVWp7M. 
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If everyone determined to be an enemy combatant by a CSRT (that is, 
virtually everyone the government chose to bring to Guantánamo) could be 
held indefinitely, a trial would make no practical difference.  In fact, a 
conviction by either a military commission or a court would result in a 
determinate sentence, which even if long would not be indefinite. 
The experience so far under the military commissions reinforces this point.  
Of the seven defendants convicted in military commissions, two are now free 
and three more may be free or out of U.S. custody soon.43  David Hicks 
pleaded guilty in 2007 to a single charge of providing material support for 
terrorism and was sentenced to nine months, which he served in Australia;44 
Hicks was released in December 2007.45  Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s 
driver and the petitioner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,46 was convicted by a military 
jury of one count of providing material support, but was acquitted of 
conspiracy.47  He was sentenced to five and a half years with credit for time 
served for all but five months.48  He was transferred to Yemen and was 
released in January 2009.49 
Three individuals who were charged during the Bush Administration have 
been convicted since he left office.  Ibrahim al-Qosi, a Sudanese citizen who 
served as bin Laden’s cook, pleaded guilty in 2010 to conspiracy and providing 
material support.50  A military jury sentenced him to fourteen years, all but two 
years of which were suspended under a secret plea agreement.51  He has 
completed serving his sentence and in July 2012 was returned to his native 
Sudan.52  The government had indicated that it may continue to hold him at 
Guantánamo as an unprivileged belligerent (enemy combatant) after he 
 
 43. By the Numbers, MIAMI HERALD, http://www.miamiherald.com/2007/11/27/322461/by-
the-numbers.html (last updated June 11, 2012). 
 44. Jackie Northam, Judge Cuts Hicks’ Sentence from 7 Years to 9 Months, NPR (Mar. 30, 
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9248761. 
 45. Raymond Bonner, Australia Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2007, at A7.  Hicks became “completely free” one year later, when he was released from a 
control order as well as a gag order prohibiting him from speaking to the press.  See Raymond 
Bonner, Full Freedom for Former Australian Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at 12. 
 46. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 47. Glaberson, supra note 34.  After the Supreme Court struck down the existing military 
commissions in his case, see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567, Salim Hamdan was recharged and 
convicted.  Glaberson, supra note 34. 
 48. U.S. Sending a Convict Back to Yemen, supra note 34. 
 49. See Yemen Releases Former bin Laden Driver from Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at 
A9. 
 50. Savage, Guantánamo Detainee Pleads Guilty, supra note 35. 
 51. The Guantánamo Docket: Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi, supra note 35. 
 52. Carol Rosenberg, Convicted al Qaida [sic] Operative Released from Guantanamo, 
Repatriated to Sudan in Plea Deal, MIAMI HERALD (July 10, 2012), http://www.miamiher 
ald.com/2012/07/10/v-fullstory/2890308/convicted-al-qaida-operative-released.html. 
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completed his sentence, but that did not happen.53  Omar Khadr, captured at 
age fifteen and accused of throwing a grenade at a military convoy and killing 
an American serviceman, pleaded guilty mid-trial to five counts in exchange 
for a sentence of eight additional years;54 after one year, he could be 
transferred to Canada to serve the remainder of his sentence and could apply 
for parole after serving two years and eight months.55  That year is up, but 
statutory restrictions on transfer may keep him in Guantánamo.56  Noor 
Uthman Muhammed, accused of being an al Qaeda trainer, was charged during 
the Bush Administration but never brought to trial.57  In February 2011, he 
pleaded guilty to providing material support and conspiracy; all but thirty-four 
months were suspended in exchange for his promise to testify against others.58  
Noor and al-Qosi are both natives of Sudan, which is on the state sponsors of 
terrorism list; Congress has prohibited transferring even detainees who have 
cleared from being transferred to countries on that list.59  Finally, Majid Khan, 
a “high-value detainee” formerly held in a CIA black site, pleaded guilty and 
agreed to testify in military commission trials in exchange for a reduced 
sentence.60 
Only one military commission defendant, Ali Hamza al Bahlul, a media 
specialist for al Qaeda, has received a life sentence after declining to cooperate 
with his trial or permit his lawyers to put on a defense.61 
 
 53. See Carol Rosenberg, Pentagon: Captive Might Not Go Home After Sentence, MIAMI 
HERALD (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/14/2067201/pentagon-captive-
might-not-go.html. 
 54. Times Topics: Omar Khadr, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/times 
topics/people/k/omar_khadr/index.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2010). 
 55. Id.  A military jury returned a sentence of forty years, but that was superseded by the 
plea agreement.  Id. 
 56. See Paul Koring, Despite Plea-Bargain Deal, Omar Khadr to Spend His Tenth New 
Year’s in Guantanamo, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/ 
world/worldview/despite-plea-bargain-deal-omar-khadr-to-spend-his-tenth-new-years-in-guantan 
amo/article2280409/.  His transfer had been delayed by the requirement in the 2011 NDAA that 
the President certify to Congress that Canada is a suitable country to which to transfer him, 
though the U.S. Government appears willing to complete the transfer.  See id. 
 57. Tyler Cabot, Noor Uthman Muhammed’s Day in Court, ESQUIRE POL. BLOG (Feb. 16, 
2012, 1:02 PM), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/guantanamo-bay-trial-5245535. 
 58. The Guantánamo Docket: Noor Uthman Muhammed, supra note 35. 
 59. Rosenberg, supra note 53. 
 60. Peter Finn, High-Value Guantanamo Bay Detainee Reaches Plea Agreement, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 23, 2012, at A07; see also discussion infra notes 156–67. 
 61. David Frakt, Let the Military Commissions Die, SALON (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.sa 
lon.com/2009/08/04/military_commissions_3/.  Frakt was the military defense lawyer for al 
Bahlul and other Guantánamo detainees.  Id.  Bahlul was convicted of providing material support 
for terrorism, solicitation, and conspiracy for serving as bin Laden’s public relations director and 
personal secretary.  Military Commissions Cases, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/ 
CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (last visited July 4, 2012) (follow “Ali Hamza Ahmad 
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It seems remarkable that, after maintaining that military commissions were 
necessary because of the extreme dangerousness of the defendants, the 
government entered into plea agreements with five of them providing for only 
a short additional time in U.S. custody.  And none of the seven was convicted 
of committing or planning an attack against the United States. 
Moreover, in choosing to hold detainees indefinitely without charge or 
trial, the Administration surely understood what politicians and the public 
often do not: that dismissals and acquittals are possible in military 
commissions.  A military commission jury acquitted Salim Hamdan of 
conspiracy while convicting him on a lesser charge.62  Military judges have 
suppressed evidence, thrown out charges against Guantánamo detainees on 
jurisdictional and sufficiency of the evidence grounds,63 and even dismissed 
charges because of torture and other ill-treatment;64 they have also taken time 
served into account in setting sentences.65  Military defense counsel have been 
zealous in advocating for their clients, and have testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee about the “rigged” nature of the proceedings.66  A 
 
Suliman al Bahlul” hyperlink).  His conviction is under appeal in the military commission system.  
Id. 
 62. Glaberson, supra note 34. 
 63. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Military Judges Dismiss Charges for 2 Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2007, at A1. 
 64. For example, Mohammed Jawad, who was either 12 (according to his family) or about 
17 (according to the U.S. military) when he was captured, was charged with throwing a grenade 
at a passing military convoy.  Guantánamo Detainee Released, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at 
A8.  The presiding judge of his military commission ruled that his confession was inadmissible 
because he was coerced by threats against Jawad and his family, and he was released after his 
habeas petition was granted.  See id.  In another example, military commission charges against 
Mohammed al Qahtani, a sixth alleged 9/11 conspirator (in addition to those currently on trial), 
were dismissed in May 2008 after Susan Crawford, the convening authority for the commissions 
in the Bush Administration and a former judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, found that he had been tortured.  Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1.  Al Qahtani is presently being held indefinitely at 
Guantánamo.  See Al Qahtani v. Obama, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/our 
cases/current-cases/al-qahtani-v.-bush%2C-al-qahtani-v.-gates (last visited June 16, 2012); The 
Guantánamo Docket: Mohammed al Qahtani, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantana 
mo/detainees/63-mohammed-al-qahtani (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
 65. David Hicks was given more than five years’ credit for time served, see supra notes 44–
45, and Salim Hamdan was given credit for sixty-one months.  U.S. Sending a Convict Back to 
Yemen, supra note 34.  The 2009 MCA attempts to forbid consideration of time served in 
sentencing.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS II-161 (2010), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d2010manual.pdf (“Any period of confinement 
included in the sentence of a military commission begins to run from the date the sentence is 
adjudged . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 66. Pamela Hess, Lawyers Criticize Bush Trials Plan, UPI.COM (July 13, 2006, 4:01 PM), 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/07/13/Lawyers-criticize-Bush-trials-
plan/UPI-38921152820894/. 
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number of military prosecutors have spoken out against—and even have 
resigned to protest—attempted command influence and procedural 
unfairness.67 
In contrast to the handful of military commission trials resulting in light 
sentences (when compared to criminal prosecutions during the same time), 171 
men remain in indefinite custody at Guantánamo.68  Eighty-nine of them 
continue to be held even though they have been approved for transfer to 
another county after the military’s own tribunals found that they were not 
enemy combatants.69  Some of these men have been imprisoned at 
Guantánamo since January 2002.70  In fact, the Obama Administration has said 
that if Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, and other military 
commission defendants are acquitted, they may still be held, indefinitely, as 
unlawful belligerents.71 
II.  THE RULE OF LAW AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
A. The Bush Administration 
Although historically military commissions were governed by the same 
rules as courts-martial,72 the military commission procedures initially 
established by executive order were dramatically devoid of procedural 
protections for defendants.  In the order establishing the commissions, 
President Bush declared that “it is not practicable to apply in military 
commissions . . . the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally 
 
 67. Those who resigned included former chief prosecutor Colonel Morris D. Davis and 
former prosecutor Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld.  See William Glaberson, Ex-
Prosecutor Tells of Push by Pentagon on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, at A12 
[hereinafter Glaberson, Ex-Prosecutor Tells of Push]; William Glaberson, Guantánamo 
Prosecutor Is Quitting in Dispute Over a Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A20; Bob Herbert, 
How Long is Long Enough?, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A21. 
 68. See By the Numbers, supra note 43; The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://pro 
jects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/ (last updated Feb. 15, 2012). 
 69. Guantánamo By the Numbers: What You Should Know & Do About Guantánamo, 
CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/files/Guantanamo_Numbers_18Jan2012.pdf (last 
updated Jan. 18, 2012). 
 70. See The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 68. 
 71. See Adam Serwer, The Dilemma of Post-Acquittal Detentions, AM. PROSPECT (July 9, 
2009), http://prospect.org/article/dilemma-post-acquittal-detentions (reporting on the testimony of 
Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
who stated in response to a question, “If, for some reason, [a detainee is] not convicted for a 
lengthy prison sentence, then, as a matter of legal authority, I think it’s our view that we would 
have the ability to detain that person”). 
 72. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40752, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
ACT OF 2006: BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1 (2009), available at http://assets. 
opencrs.com/rpts/R40752_20090908.pdf.  For the history of the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, see generally id. 
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recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.”73  
The implementing regulations dispensed with virtually all of the protections 
known to the criminal law. 
Defendants and civilian counsel could be excluded from the trial and could 
be denied the right even to see the evidence against defendants if the 
proceeding were closed.74  Appointed military counsel would be permitted to 
see such evidence, but could be prohibited from discussing it with the accused 
or civilian counsel.75  The accused and his lawyer could also be denied access 
to classified evidence that is admitted, if the presiding officer determined this 
would not deny a fair trial.76  Instead of following the rules of evidence, the 
presiding officer could admit any evidence that “would have probative value to 
a reasonable person.”77  Hearsay and coerced testimony could be admitted, and 
live testimony need not be sworn.78  Evidence obtained by coercion or abuse 
would be admissible if the judge determined that it was probative, and a 
majority of the commission could overturn the presiding officer’s decision that 
evidence was not probative.79  Although the standard of proof remains “beyond 
a reasonable doubt,” in noncapital cases, a nonunanimous verdict is 
permissible to convict.80  There was no right to judicial review for sentences of 
less than ten years.81 
The composition of the commission provided scant procedural protections 
for the accused.  Although the presiding officer had to be a lawyer, he or she 
was not required to have had experience as a military judge.82  Unlike courts-
martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), neither the 
presiding officer, other members of the commission, nor military prosecutors 
would be structurally isolated from command influence.83  Indeed, Morris 
Davis, the former chief prosecutor for the military commissions, testified as a 
 
 73. Military Order of November 13, 2001, supra note 10, § 1(f). 
 74. See MCO, supra note 19, § 6(B)(3). 
 75. Id. (“Defense Counsel may not disclose any information presented during a closed 
session to individuals excluded from such proceeding or part thereof.”). 
 76. See id. §§ 6(B)(1), (3) (“Grounds for closure include the protection of information 
classified or classifiable[;] . . . information protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; 
the physical safety of participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses; 
intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national security 
interests.”). 
 77. Id. § 6(D)(1). 
 78. See id. §§ 6(D)(2)(b), 6(D)(3). 
 79. See MCO, supra note 19, § 6(D)(1). 
 80. Id. at § 6(F). 
 81. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(3)(B), 119 Stat. 2739, 
2743 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 650 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 82. See MCO, supra note 19, at § 4(A)(4). 
 83. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 650 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
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defense witness in Salim Hamdan’s commission proceedings, while still on 
active duty, that he had been subject to command pressure in Hamdan’s case 
and others on charging decisions and the use of coerced testimony.84  The 
presiding officer of Hamdan’s military commission eventually barred 
Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann, legal adviser to the convening 
authority, from any further role in Hamdan’s case because his action directing 
the use of “evidence that the Chief Prosecutor considered tainted and 
unreliable, or perhaps obtained as the result of torture or coercion, was clearly 
an effort to influence the professional judgment of the Chief Prosecutor”85 and 
because “[Hartmann]’s ability to continue to perform his duties in a neutral and 
objective manner” had been “seriously called into question.”86 
Military defense counsel charged that the commissions were “a half-
hearted and disorganized effort by a skeleton group of relatively inexperienced 
attorneys to prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be 
rigged.”87  Mohammed Jawad’s former military prosecutor testified as a 
defense witness in Jawad’s military commission proceedings that it was 
impossible to obtain a fair trial in the military commission system and that 
military investigators denied exculpatory evidence not only to the defense but 
also to the prosecution.88 
Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift testified before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that prosecutors were not required to disclose to defense lawyers 
exculpatory evidence held by other agencies, such as the CIA.89  Documents 
that were disclosed were designated “protected information” and could not be 
disclosed to the client.90  Because “rank hearsay” was admissible, the 
prosecution’s case consisted mainly of testimony by law enforcement officials 
summarizing what others said—and the source witnesses were not made 
available for cross-examination.91  The defense did not have the right to call 
witnesses, but had to ask the prosecution for permission, which was often 
refused.92  Defendants, including Hicks and Hamdan, were excluded from their 
 
 84. See Glaberson, supra note 67. 
 85. United States v. Hamdan, No. D-026, at 1, 11, 12 (Military Comm’n May 9, 2008) 
(Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Unlawful Influence)) [hereinafter Hamdan Ruling on Motion to 
Dismiss], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/May2008/D026.pdf; see William Glaberson, 
Judge’s Guantánamo Ruling Bodes Ill for System, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2008, at A26. 
 86. Hamdan Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 85, at 12. 
 87. Hess, supra note 66 (recounting a 2004 email written by Air Force Captain John Carr). 
 88. Darrel J. Vandeveld, I Was Slow to Recognize the Stain of Guantanamo, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 18, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/14/AR2009 
011402319.html. 
 89. Hess, supra note 66 (reporting Colonel Swift’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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own trials during jury selection.93  Swift also charged that the “handpicked” 
commissions and review panels were “stacked” in favor of the prosecution.94 
The Bush Administration hewed determinedly to its law-free strategy, 
responding to setbacks in the Supreme Court by attempting to withdraw federal 
court jurisdiction to hear habeas claims (or “any other action”) by detainees95 
and by limiting protections to the minimum it thought the Court might 
permit.96  As a practical matter, these efforts seem to have been intended 
primarily to preserve the system of indefinite detention, for the Administration 
made almost no use of military commissions.  But Hamdan was followed by 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“2006 MCA”), which attempted to 
establish military commissions as “regularly constituted court[s]” (and 
therefore in compliance with the Geneva Conventions) and declared that the 
Geneva Conventions did not provide a “source of rights” for an alien unlawful 
enemy combatant in the military commissions system.97  The 2006 MCA 
moderated some of the more egregious features of the prior regulations, but 
still failed to provide essential protections that would be taken for granted in 
federal court. 
B. The Obama Administration 
President Obama campaigned on a promise to close Guantánamo and shut 
down the military commissions,98 and on the first day of his Administration he 
signed executive orders directing that Guantánamo be closed within a year,99 
requiring that all interrogations in the context of armed conflict be conducted 
in accordance with the standards of the Army Field Manual,100 creating a task 
force to review the cases of all the Guantánamo detainees with a view to 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Hess, supra note 66. 
 95. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1)–(2), 119 Stat. 2739, 
2742 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); Military Order 
of November 13, 2001, supra note 10, § 7(b). 
 96. See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military 
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1410 
(2002) (describing the protections that the Bush Administration implemented). 
 97. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b(f)–(g), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2602 (codified 10 U.S.C. § 948b). 
 98. Sen. Barack Obama, supra note 5 (“As President, I will close Guantanamo, reject the 
Military Commissions Act, and adhere to the Geneva Conventions.”). 
 99. Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 6, § 3.  President Obama also ordered the CIA to 
close all of its detention facilities worldwide, Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199 § 4(a) (2009), 
established Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the “Minimum Baseline” for 
treatment of individuals detained in “any armed conflict,” and explicitly directed that they be 
treated in accordance with the Torture Act, the Detainee Treatment Act (prohibiting cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment), and the Convention Against Torture, id. § 3(a). 
 100. Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 99, § 3(c). 
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releasing, transferring, or prosecuting them in civilian courts, and closing down 
the military commissions pending the task force’s report.101  He also 
announced that the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, and four others, would be tried on criminal charges in federal 
court in New York.102  The President and Attorney General Eric Holder have 
continued to insist that criminal prosecutions are preferable to military trials 
and that civilian courts are fully able to try suspected terrorists in accordance 
with the criminal law.103  They have been steadily forced to fall back from 
these goals, however, by political opposition and congressional restrictions.104 
Vigorous political opposition to the proposed trials was triggered in part by 
the trial of Ahmed Ghailani, in which a federal judge ruled certain evidence 
inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree of torture, and a federal jury 
acquitted the defendant on all but one charge105 (though the defendant received 
a life sentence).106  Fear of acquittal eventually led to congressional funding 
restrictions that made it impossible to transfer any Guantánamo detainees to 
the United States for trial.107 
C. Congress Takes the Wheel 
Congress passed the first funding restrictions in June 2009, five months 
before the announcement that the 9/11 conspirators would be tried in New 
York.108  These provisions required forty-five days notice to Congress before 
transferring detainees from Guantánamo to the United States for purposes of 
 
 101. Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 6, §§ 4, 7. 
 102. Savage, U.S. To Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind, supra note 7. 
 103. Jason Ryan & Huma Khan, In Reversal, Obama Orders Guantanamo Military Trial for 
9/11 Mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Apr. 4, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/911-
mastermind-khalid-sheikh-mohammed-military-commission/story?id=13291750#.TzSF9kxW 
p7M. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Jury Acquits Former Detainee of Most Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2010, at A1. 
 106. Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2011, at A18. 
 107. See Nicolas L. Martinez, Note, Pinching the President’s Prosecutorial Prerogative: Can 
Congress Use Its Purse Power to Block Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Transfer to the United 
States?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1469, 1471, 1474–78 (2012).  Because Guantánamo is not within the 
jurisdiction of any U.S. district court, prisoners would have to be transferred in order to be tried.  
See id. 
 108. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(c), 123 Stat. 
1859, 1920 (preventing funds from being used to transfer detainees from Guantánamo to the 
United States for trial after June 24, 2009); Savage, U.S. To Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind, supra 
note 7 (noting that Obama’s Administration did not announce the trial of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed in federal court until November of 2009). 
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detention or prosecution.109  Similar restrictions were attached to other 
spending bills during the remainder of 2009.110  After the announcement that 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed would be tried in New York, Congress responded 
with a provision in the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act prohibiting 
the use of funds authorized in the act to transfer or release Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed or any other noncitizen held at Guantánamo into the United 
States.111  Rather than simply requiring advance notice, this provision 
prohibited the use of funds to bring Guantánamo detainees to the United States 
for any purpose, and it referred to Mohammed by name.112  The restriction did 
not apply to individuals held by other agencies, such as the CIA, or in locations 
other than Guantánamo, but it did cover the individuals who were scheduled 
for trial in New York.113  Though President Obama signed the bill, he criticized 
it as “a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch 
authority to determine when and where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees, 
based on the facts and the circumstances of each case and our national security 
interests.”114  Notably, up until then, Obama had carefully avoided asserting 
the constitutional prerogatives of the executive as a legal basis for his actions 
with respect to detainees. 
Without the means to bring detainees to the United States for trial,115 the 
government announced that military commissions would be resumed.116  
 
 109. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 § 14103(c)–(d).  President Obama refrained 
from objecting to § 14103 in his signing statement, even though he demurred to five other 
sections contained in the same bill.  Presidential Statement on Signing the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 2009, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 512 (June 24, 2009). 
 110. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 
9011, 123 Stat. 3409, 3466–68 (2009). 
 111. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-
383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351.  The section states: 
  None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 2011 may 
be used to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release to or within the United 
States, its territories, or possessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee 
who— 
  (1) is not a United States citizen or a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
States; and 
  (2) is or was held on or after January 20, 2009, at United States Naval Station, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. 
Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Presidential Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011). 
 115. No federal court has jurisdiction over Cuba; a criminal trial would have to be held within 
the United States or one of its possessions. 
 116. Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, 
at A1 [hereinafter Savage, In a Reversal]. 
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Acknowledging that the funding ban was “unlikely to be repealed in the 
immediate future,” Attorney General Holder officially referred the 9/11 
prosecutions to the Department of Defense in order to eliminate any further 
delay.117  Eleven days after that announcement, Congress passed the 2011 
Defense Appropriations Act prohibiting the use of funds appropriated for that 
act as well as “any other Act” to transfer noncitizen detainees from 
Guantánamo.118 
Before the official resumption of military commission prosecutions, the 
President sought legislation to improve the existing commission procedures,119 
resulting in the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (“2009 MCA”).120  Though 
the 2009 MCA improved many commission procedures by making them more 
like regular courts-martial,121 providing additional procedural protections such 
as tightened hearsay rules,122 barring the use of testimony obtained by cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment,123 and providing increased resources for the 
defense,124 the commissions remain fundamentally flawed.  Even the improved 
procedures under the 2009 MCA fall substantially short of the protections 
afforded in criminal prosecutions.  As one example, the prosecution may rely 
on unclassified summaries of classified evidence, and neither the defendants 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-10, § 1112, 125 Stat. 38, 104–05.  In a signing statement, President Obama objected to these 
provisions as “dangerous and unprecedented” but did not say they were unconstitutional.  See 
Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2011, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 263 (Apr. 15, 2011). 
 119. Presidential Statement on Military Commissions, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 364 
(May 15, 2009). The President had taken the position that military commissions were appropriate 
to try violations of the laws of war.  See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President 
on National Security (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter Remarks by the President on National 
Security], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-
On-National-Security-5-21-09/. 
 120. Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–2614 (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (2010)). 
 121. 10 U.S.C. § 949a (Supp. IV 2011). 
 122. Id. § 949a(b)(3)(D). 
 123. Id. § 948r.  While statements by the accused cannot be admitted unless they were 
“voluntary,” statements by others are not within this prohibition, nor is evidence derived from 
coerced statements, or evidence obtained by “clean teams” from untainted sources to duplicate 
tainted evidence.  See Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15–22, 2010, at 52, 58 (noting the use of such “clean teams” in 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s case). 
 124. 10 U.S.C. § 949j.  The statute also replaced the provision that the Geneva Conventions 
could not be used as a source of rights with a provision declaring that the Conventions do not 
create a cause of action.  Compare Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 
948b(g), 120 Stat. 2600, 2602 (codified 10 U.S.C. § 948b), with 10 U.S.C. at § 948b(e). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1133 
nor their lawyers are permitted to view the classified evidence.125  This 
provision has been implemented in the trial of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.126  
Moreover, the military claimed authority to examine attorney-client 
communications, something that would not be permitted in federal court.127  
Nevertheless, commission proceedings against Nashiri,128 Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, and others have continued.129 
Though Holder and Obama considered it very important to close down 
Guantánamo and stop or minimize the use of military commissions, they faced 
two problems that have turned out to be insuperable.  First, the Bush 
Administration torture policies130 meant that the United States was holding 
some number of prisoners who actually were serious terrorists, but who could 
not be tried in either civilian or military courts because the evidence obtained 
against them was obtained through illegal means.131  Both for political and 
national security reasons, the President could not release such individuals, and 
it appears that he anticipated that some prisoners would therefore continue to 
 
 125. 10 U.S.C. §§ 949p-1 to p-7; Warren Richey, USS Cole Bombing: Judge Allows 
Prosecution to Use ‘Sanitized’ Evidence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 18, 2012, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0118/USS-Cole-bombing-Judge-allows-prosecu 
tion-to-use-sanitized-evidence. 
 126. Richey, supra note 125. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Press Release, Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Statement of the Attorney General on 
the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter AG Statement on the 
Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators], available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/ 
2011/ag-speech-110404.html (announcing that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Muhammad 
Bin Attash, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, Ali Abdul-Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi would be 
tried by military commission). 
 130. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, at 3–4 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/ 
memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf (requiring “specific intent” for a finding of torture, thus allowing 
physical mistreatment without a finding of torture).  These “Torture Memos” were later 
repudiated by the Obama Administration.  Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 99, § 3(c).  For a 
discussion of the legal opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel during the early part of the Bush 
Administration, see generally Alexander, supra note 38. 
 131. 10 U.S.C. § 948r (Supp. IV 2011) (excluding evidence obtained by torture in the military 
commission context); see, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967) (excluding evidence 
obtained by mistreatment or the threat of mistreatment in the federal court context).  The 
President explained that there were 
detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the 
American people. . . .  [T]here may be a number of people who cannot be prosecuted for 
past crimes, in some cases because evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose a 
threat to the security of the United States. . . .  Let me repeat: I am not going to release 
individuals who endanger the American people. 
Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 119. 
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be held indefinitely without charge.132  This is the “here’s another nice mess 
you’ve gotten us into” problem. 
The number of individuals who inevitably fall into this category is unclear, 
however.  The decision to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in federal court, 
despite his having been waterboarded 183 times,133 indicates that the Justice 
Department was confident it had sufficient untainted evidence to secure his 
conviction, as well as that of the other alleged 9/11 conspirators.  Additionally, 
the Administration has recently been entering into plea bargains with detainees 
in exchange for promises to testify, evidently to avoid the need to rely on 
evidence obtained through torture or other illegal treatment.134 
Second, Republicans realized that opposing criminal trials was a political 
winner for them.  This strategy may have blindsided the Administration, since 
both the Clinton and Bush Administrations had conducted many successful 
terrorism trials135 and the prospect of trying the planners of the 9/11 attacks in 
New York City seemed to Holder a triumph for American democracy.136  It 
was widely thought that the resumption of military commissions “marked a 
significant moment of capitulation in the Obama administration’s largely 
frustrated effort to dismantle counterterrorism architecture left behind by 
former President George W. Bush.”137 
Moreover, powerful voices inside the Administration, such as Rahm 
Emanuel, were arguing that fighting for criminal prosecutions was a distraction 
from other issues and would in fact be counterproductive politically.138  By the 
time the task force report was issued in 2010, 139 it became clear that it would 
 
 132. Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 119. 
 133. Times Topics: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Guantánamo 9/11 Attacks Trial), N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/khalid_shaikh_mohammed/index. 
html (last updated May 7, 2012). 
 134. See infra notes 156–67 and accompanying text (discussing the plea agreement of Majid 
Khan, a former “high value detainee” who pleaded guilty and agreed to testify in military 
commission trials in exchange for a sentence of 19 to 25 years). 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
Zacarias Moussaoui’s convictions and sentences for his involvement in the 9/11 attacks, which 
occurred during the Bush Administration); Jo Thomas, Appeals Process Could Delay Execution 
for Many Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at 1 (reporting the jury’s unanimous vote for the 
death penalty for Timothy McVeigh, which occurred during the Clinton Administration); Jo 
Thomas, Verdict is Cheered, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1997, at A1 (reporting the conviction of 
Timothy McVeigh). 
 136. See Savage, U.S. To Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind, supra note 7. 
 137. Savage, In a Reversal, supra note 116. 
 138. See RON SUSKIND, CONFIDENCE MEN: WALL STREET, WASHINGTON, AND THE 
EDUCATION OF A PRESIDENT 380 (2011). 
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf [hereinafter 
FINAL REPORT]. 
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be difficult to bring defendants to the United States for trial.  Thus Obama and 
Holder were forced to turn to military commissions or have no trials at all.  As 
Holder stated, 
[W]e must face a simple truth: those restrictions are unlikely to be repealed in 
the immediate future. 
  And we simply cannot allow a trial to be delayed any longer for the 
victims of the 9/11 attacks or for their family members who have waited for 
nearly a decade for justice.140 
Still, the President and the Attorney General continued to advocate for 
criminal trials rather than military tribunals.  Holder in particular stated 
strongly and repeatedly that criminal trials were preferable, that he was 
convinced that convictions could and would be obtained, and that criminal 
trials would vindicate the American system.141  In referring the cases against 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four alleged co-conspirators to a military 
commission, Holder stated that the case was “one of the most well-researched 
and documented cases I have ever seen in my decades of experience as a 
prosecutor”142 and that “the best venue for prosecution was in federal court.  I 
stand by that decision today.”143  He declared that the “unwise and 
unwarranted restrictions” imposed by Congress “undermine our 
counterterrorism efforts . . . have taken one of the nation’s most tested 
counterterrorism tools off the table and tied our hands . . . .”144  Obama 
repeated in signing statements that he wanted to eliminate military trials and 
that preventing the government from choosing criminal prosecutions tied its 
hands in the fight against terrorism.145  John Brennan, the President’s chief 
counterterrorism adviser, has stated repeatedly in strong terms, with apparent 
Administration approval, that no additional prisoners will be brought to 
Guantánamo.146 
 
 140. AG Statement on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators, supra note 129; Robert 
Chesney, AG Holder’s Statement on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators, and Link to the 
SDNY Indictment and Nolle Prosequi Filing, LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2011, 2:28 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/04/ag-holders-statement-on-the-prosecution-of-the-911-con 
spirators-and-link-to-the-sdny-indictment/. 
 141. See, e.g., AG Statement on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators, supra note 129. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, supra note 118; Presidential Statement on Military 
Commissions, supra note 119. 
 146. See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & 
Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening 
Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011) (transcript available at 
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The Administration found ways to implement criminal prosecutions rather 
than military commissions.  For example, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was 
held and interrogated on a Navy ship for two months and then was brought 
directly to New York to face criminal charges.147  Because he had not been in 
custody at Guantánamo this procedure did not violate the spending restrictions 
that were then in place148 (nor would they have violated the 2012 NDAA as 
ultimately passed).149  Suspected terrorists who were captured inside the 
United States—such as Faisal Shahzad, the “Times Square Bomber”150 and 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “Underwear Bomber”151—were handled 
within the criminal justice system. 
Nevertheless, some military commission prosecutions that were initiated 
during the Bush Administration were permitted to go forward.  The first trial to 
begin during the Obama Administration was that of Omar Khadr, the child 
soldier accused of killing an American soldier with a grenade.152  The military 
judge ruled—perhaps unexpectedly—that Khadr’s confession was admissible 
even though it had been obtained through grotesquely coercive threats.153  
Though officials in the White House, Justice Department, and Pentagon were 
reported to have preferred a plea bargain to a trial, other cases had been stayed, 
bringing the Khadr case to the front of the line,154 and officials feared that 
intervening might violate the 2009 MCA’s prohibition on command 
influence.155 
The first military commission case to be brought entirely during the 




 147. Ken Dilanian, Terror Suspect Held on Ship for Months, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A1. 
 148. See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text (describing the spending restrictions). 
 149. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No 112-81, 
§1022, 125 Stat. 1298, 1563 (2011). 
 150. Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen who admitted to being a member of the Taliban, was 
indicted in New York, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to life in prison.  Michael Wilson, 
Judgment Day in Two High-Profile Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, at A25. 
 151. Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian citizen who attempted to blow up a plane on Christmas Day, 
2009 and admitted to working on behalf of al Qaeda, pleaded guilty in federal court in Detroit and 
was sentenced to four consecutive life terms.  Nick Bunkley, Would-Be Plane Bomber Is 
Sentenced to Life in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at A3. 
 152. Charlie Savage, U.S. Is Wary of First Case for Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, at 
A1 [hereinafter Savage, U.S. Is Wary]. 
 153. Khadr, who may have been as young as fifteen when he was captured, was told that an 
Afghan youth who had not cooperated with interrogators had been sent to prison where he died 
after being raped.  Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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held in the CIA’s secret prisons from 2003 to 2006,156 when he was transferred 
to Guantánamo.157  Khan, a native of Pakistan who had held a U.S. green card 
and graduated from a suburban Baltimore high school, was accused of murder, 
attempted murder, spying, and providing material support to terrorism.158  
Khan allegedly worked closely with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and plotted to 
assassinate former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and to commit other 
terrorist acts.159  Eight days after announcing the charges, the Pentagon 
announced that Khan had agreed to plead guilty and testify in other military 
commission trials for the next four years, after which he would be eligible for 
transfer to Pakistan.160  Presumably he will testify at the trials of Mohammed, 
Ali, and perhaps other alleged 9/11 conspirators. 
Khan pleaded guilty to five charges, each carrying a possible life 
sentence.161  Under the plea agreement, he will receive a maximum sentence of 
twenty-five years.162  Sentencing will be deferred for four years,163 after which, 
if he cooperates, he will receive a sentence “not to exceed 19 years.”164  Khan 
stipulated to conspiring with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to assassinate the 
then-president of Pakistan, poison water reservoirs, explode underground 
gasoline storage tanks, and serve as an al Qaeda sleeper agent,165 and to 
conspiring with Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali, another alleged 9/11 conspirator 
charged along with Mohammed,166 and Aafia Siddiqui, who was convicted of 
 
 156. Finn, supra note 60. 
 157. Carol Rosenberg, Pentagon Charges Former U.S. Resident at Guantánamo in Terror 
Plot, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/14/2641868/penta 
gon-charges-former-us-resident.html.  Khan is also accused of serving as an al Qaeda courier and 
conspiring to blow up gas stations in the United States.  He faces a maximum sentence of life in 
prison.  Id. 
 158. Id.; Finn, supra note 60. 
 159. Finn, supra note 60. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Offer for Pretrial Agreement ¶ 20, United States v. Khan (Military Comm’n Feb. 13, 
2012) [hereinafter Offer for Pretrial Agreement], available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/Khan-AE012-PTA.pdf. 
 162. Appendix A to Offer for Pretrial Agreement ¶ 1, United States v. Khan (Military 
Comm’n Feb. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Appendix A to Offer for Pretrial Agreement], available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Khan-AE013-Appendix-A.pdf. 
 163. Offer for Pretrial Agreement, supra note 161, ¶ 18. 
 164. Appendix A to Offer for Pretrial Agreement, supra note 162, ¶ 3. 
 165. Stipulation of Fact ¶ 12, United States v. Khan (Military Comm’n Feb. 13, 2012) 
[hereinafter Stipulation of Fact], available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/02/Khan-PE001-Stipulation-of-Fact.pdf. 
 166. Id. ¶ 43; AG Statement on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators, supra note 129. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1138 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1115 
attempting to murder her interrogators in Afghanistan and sentenced to 86 
years.167 
The stakes in the struggle between Congress and the President over control 
of detainee policy rose in May 2011, when the Republican-led House passed a 
version of the 2012 NDAA that contained sweeping new restrictions on the 
President’s ability to institute criminal prosecutions.  The House bill would 
have allowed military detention of any suspected terrorist, even U.S citizens 
captured inside the United States, would have required military detention for 
most noncitizen terrorism suspects, and would have required any foreign 
national who has engaged in certain terrorism-related conduct to be tried by 
military commissions.168  Federal court would no longer be an option for these 
individuals.  The House version, moreover, would have extended the 
congressional funding restrictions to the transfer of all non-American detainees 
held abroad by the Department of Defense, not just those incarcerated at 
Guantánamo.169 
The Senate’s original version was equally controversial because, in 
addition to codifying the President’s authority to detain individuals (including 
U.S. citizens) perhaps indefinitely,170 the bill also contained a mandatory 
military detention provision for certain foreign nationals associated with 
al Qaeda.171  In an effort to dissuade the President from exercising his veto 
power, Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed a series of amendments to the 
Senate’s version.172  But the only one of Feinstein’s proposed amendments that 
passed merely recognized that the provision codifying the President’s detention 
authority did nothing to change existing law, effectively punting to the courts 
the task of defining that authority’s scope.173 
The director of the FBI testified that the restrictions introduced 
“uncertainty” that could hobble counterterrorism efforts of law enforcement 
 
 167. Stipulation of Fact, supra note 165, ¶¶ 94–97; Benjamin Weiser, Scientist Gets 86 Years 
for Firing at Americans, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:08 PM), http://city 
room.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/scientist-gets-86-years-for-firing-at-americans/. 
 168. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. 
§§ 1034, 1039, 1046  (as passed by House, May 26, 2011). 
 169. Id. § 1039. 
 170. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, S. 1867, 112th Cong. § 1031 
(as passed by Senate, Dec. 1, 2011). 
 171. Id. § 1032. 
 172. See Amendments for S.1867, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
L?d112:./temp/~bdaBzCn:1[1-381](Amendments_For_S.1867)&./temp/~bdRplQ[[o]] (last 
updated Dec. 1, 2011); see also Amendments to S.1867, DoD Authorization, U.S. SENATE 
DEMOCRATS (Dec. 1, 2011, 9:30 AM), http://democrats.senate.gov/2011/12/01/amendments-to-s-
1867-the-department-of-defense-authorization-act/. 
 173. S. 1867, § 1031(e) (incorporating amendment 1456 to S. 1867). 
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and harm national security.174  Retired generals opposed the bills.175  The 
President threatened to veto the bill, stating that it would “disrupt the 
Executive branch’s ability to enforce the law and impose unwise and 
unwarranted restrictions on the U.S. Government’s ability to aggressively 
combat international terrorism . . . .”176  Moreover, he demurred that the 
mandatory military custody provisions would “tie the hands of our intelligence 
and law enforcement professionals” by “limit[ing] the flexibility of our 
national security professionals to choose, based on the evidence and the facts 
and circumstances of each case, which tool for incapacitating dangerous 
terrorists best serves our national security interests.”177 
In the end, after additional concessions in the House-Senate conference, 
the Senate’s mandatory military detention provision remained in the final 
bill,178 but House provisions that would have required trials by military 
commission, created a new authorization for the use of military force against 
al Qaeda and associated forces,179 and expanded the funding restrictions were 
deleted to avoid a presidential veto.180  The provision authorizing mandatory 
military detention was also watered down from its original form in response to 
concerns in the White House and federal law enforcement community.181  
Although President Obama still had “serious reservations” about the 2012 
NDAA’s detainee-related provisions, their sweeping scope had been limited 
sufficiently by the end of the legislative process for him to give the final bill 
his grudging assent.182  In a signing statement President Obama objected that 
some of the provisions “would, under certain circumstances, violate 
constitutional separation of powers principles.”183  It should be noted, however, 
 
 174. See Charlie Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat Over Military Authorization Bill After 
Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, at A30 [hereinafter Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat]. 
 175. Charles C. Krulak & Joseph P. Hoar, Op-Ed., Guantánamo Forever?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 2011, at A35. 
 176. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 1867 – NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2012, at 
1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/ 
saps1867s_20111117.pdf. 
 177. Id. at 2. 
 178. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No 112-81, §1022, 
125 Stat. 1298, 1563 (2011); see also Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat, supra note 174. 
 179. Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat, supra note 174. 
 180. Compare National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1027, with 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1039 (as 
passed by House, May 26, 2011). 
 181. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1022(d) (explicitly 
stating that it did not affect the FBI’s existing authority). 
 182. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2012, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 978, at 1 (Dec. 31, 2011). 
 183. Id. at 3. 
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that this Administration has steadfastly declined to assert Article II as the 
source of its powers respecting detainee policy. 
Congress’s increasingly stringent restrictions on transporting detainees 
from Guantánamo mean that criminal prosecutions will be impossible for the 
foreseeable future, and the D.C. Circuit’s steadfast refusal to recognize any 
habeas rights for detainees184 makes it unlikely that this will change unless a 
military commission results in a conviction (not a plea agreement) that can be 
appealed.  It would be foolish to expect any such appeal to be decided anytime 
soon: Ali al Bahlul was convicted by a military commission in November 2008 
and his appeal has yet to be decided.185 
III.  STILL ILLEGAL AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 
The lack of procedural protections for the accused is not the only problem 
with the revived military commissions.  Just as importantly, the military 
commissions as currently constituted are legally invalid.  Military commissions 
are not routine in wartime: they have not been used by the United States in any 
previous armed conflicts since World War II.186  Their permissible jurisdiction 
is strictly circumscribed.  In Hamdan, the plurality described four well-
established “preconditions” for the exercise of jurisdiction by a military 
commission.187  Two go to the nature of the offenses that may be charged: 
 
 184. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 248–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that habeas 
courts must give the government’s evidence a presumption of accuracy); Abdah v. Obama, 630 
F.3d 1047, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to revisit Kiyemba II); Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 
1046, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding, in Kiyemba I on remand, that habeas court 
cannot review government’s decision that a country is an “appropriate” place to transfer the 
detainee); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 510, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding 
that habeas court cannot require government to notify the detainee or the court if it plans to 
transfer the detainee out of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 
F.3d 1022, 1024, 1027–28 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that a habeas court has no power to release 
detainees into the United States even if there is no other country to take them), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 
1235 (2010), reinstated as amended by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Saleh v. Titan, 580 F.3d 
1, 5–13 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (private contractor interrogators have sovereign immunity against civil 
damages actions by detainees); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(declaring, after Boumediene, that “basic constitutional protections” such as due process are not 
available to aliens abroad).  On June 11, 2012, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, without 
dissent, in Latif  and six other detainee cases.  Adam Liptak, Justices Reject Detainees’ Appeal, 
Leaving Cloud Over Earlier Guantánamo Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2012, at A14.  This 
appears to complete the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of Boumediene. 
 185. Military Commissions Cases, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/CASES/Mil 
itaryCommissions.aspx (last visited July 4, 2012) (follow “Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul” 
hyperlink). 
 186. See ELSEA, supra note 72, at 2; Fact Sheet: Military Commissions, U.S. DEP’T DEF. 1 
(Feb. 8, 2007), http://www.defense.gov/news/d2007OMCFactSheet08Feb07.pdf. 
 187. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
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 “[A] military commission not established pursuant to martial law or an 
occupation may try only ‘[i]ndividuals of the enemy’s army who have been 
guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation of the laws of 
war’ . . . .”188 
 “[A] law-of-war commission has jurisdiction to try only two kinds of 
offense: ‘Violations of the laws and usages of war cognizable by military 
tribunals only,’ and ‘[b]reaches of military orders or regulations for which 
offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the Articles of 
war.’”189 
The Obama Administration has expressly acknowledged that military 
commissions may only hear violations of the laws of war—war crimes.  “Their 
jurisdiction is substantially narrower than our federal courts: they are properly 
used only in connection with an armed conflict, and only to prosecute offenses 
against the law of war committed in the course of that conflict.”190 
Yet almost without exception, the charges that have been brought do not 
state violations of the law of war.  Most of the defendants have been charged 
 
 188. Id. at 597–98 (emphasis added) (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND 
PRECEDENTS 838 (2d ed. 1920)). 
 189. Id. at 598 (emphasis added) (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 199, at 839).  The full 
quotation follows: 
The classic treatise penned by Colonel William Winthrop, whom we have called “the 
‘Blackstone of Military Law,’” describes at least four preconditions for exercise of 
jurisdiction by a tribunal of the type convened to try Hamdan.  First, “[a] military 
commission, (except where otherwise authorized by statute), can legally assume 
jurisdiction only of offences committed within the field of the command of the convening 
commander.”  The “field of the command” in these circumstances means the “theatre of 
war.”  Second, the offense charged “must have been committed within the period of the 
war.”  No jurisdiction exists to try offenses “committed either before or after the war.”  
Third, a military commission not established pursuant to martial law or an occupation 
may try only “[i]ndividuals of the enemy’s army who have been guilty of illegitimate 
warfare or other offences in violation of the laws of war” and members of one’s own army 
“who, in time of war, become chargeable with crimes or offences not cognizable, or 
triable, by the criminal courts or under the Articles of war.”  Finally, a law-of-war 
commission has jurisdiction to try only two kinds of offense: “Violations of the laws and 
usages of war cognizable by military tribunals only,” and “[b]reaches of military orders or 
regulations for which offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the Articles 
of war.” 
Id. at 597–98 (citations omitted).  The Court also notes: 
Winthrop adds as a fifth, albeit not-always-complied-with, criterion that “the trial must be 
had within the theatre of war . . . ; that, if held elsewhere, and where the civil courts are 
open and available, the proceedings and sentence will be coram non judice.” 
Id. at 598 n.29. 
 190. Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann & Colonel Mark Martins, Det. Policy Task Force, 
to Att’y Gen. &  Sec’y of Def. 3 (July 20, 2009) [hereinafter Preliminary Report] (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/detention072009.pdf. 
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with conspiracy and/or providing material support for terrorism.191  Neither 
offense is a violation of the law of war.192  Indeed, a plurality of the Supreme 
Court would have held that conspiracy, one of the most common military 
commission charges, was not a war crime and therefore was not a legally 
permissible basis for a military prosecution.193 
Another popular charge is “murder in violation of the law of war.”  Omar 
Khadr, Mohammed Jawad (another child soldier whose confession was ruled 
inadmissible by a military judge and who was released following a successful 
habeas petition194), and others were charged with this offense for attacking 
U.S. soldiers or convoys.195  Such conduct also is not a violation of the law of 
war—at least if the victim is not a “protected person” and the means is not a 
prohibited means.196 
The question whether providing material support is an offense triable by 
military commission is currently before the D.C. Circuit in Salim Hamdan’s 
appeal of his military commission proceedings.197  Hamdan argues that the 
 
 191. See The Guantanamo Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/features/guantana 
mo (last visited May 18, 2012). 
 192. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 598, 610 (plurality opinion) (finding that conspiracy is not a 
violation of the law of war); Samuel T. Morison, History and Tradition in American Military 
Justice, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 121, 124 (2011) (arguing that providing material support has never 
before been considered a law-of-war offense). 
 193. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 611–12. 
 194. Mohammed Jawad - Habeas Corpus, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 24, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/mohammed-jawad-habeas-corpus. 
 195. See United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 338, 338 & n.4, 339 & n.8 (Military Comm’n 2008) 
(Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss – Lack of Personal Jurisdiction: Child Soldier (D-012)). 
 196. Civil War military tribunals did try an offense for murder in violation of the law of war, 
which involved killing soldiers after they had surrendered or while they were held as prisoners of 
war; such killings are indeed violations of the law of war.  See Government’s Motion: Request for 
Finding’s [sic] Instruction on Charge I, II and III (as It Pertains to Murder in Violation of the Law 
of War) at 5–6, United States v. Khadr (Military Comm’n Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter 
Government’s Motion], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/AE-295-AE295-E(P009).pdf; 
Defense Response to Government’s Request for Finding’s Instruction on Charges I, II and III (as 
It Pertains to Murder in Violation of the Law of War) and Defense Cross-Motion to Dismiss and 
Strike at 2, United States v. Khadr (Military Comm’n Nov. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Defense 
Response], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/AE-295-AE295-E(P009).pdf.  Civil War 
commissions also tried unlawful combatants who killed soldiers or civilians, but Civil War 
military commissions tried both offenses against the laws of war and ordinary crimes committed 
in occupied territory.  See Government’s Motion, supra, at 5–6; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
590.  The current military commissions are law-of-war tribunals, not occupation tribunals.  See 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597 (“Since Guantanamo Bay is neither enemy-occupied territory nor under 
martial law, the law-of-war commission is the only model available.”). 
 197. Steve Vladeck, Government Brief in Hamdan: The Looming Article III Problem . . ., 
LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/01/government-
brief-in-hamdan-the-looming-article-iii-problem/.  The D.C. Circuit heard argument on May 3, 
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offense of providing material support for terrorism is not triable before a 
military commission because it is not a violation of the law of war.198  The 
government responds that even if providing material support is not a violation 
of the law of nations, it is triable by military commission under the “U.S. 
common law of war.”199 
It is far from clear that there is any such thing as a “U.S. common law of 
war” distinct from the international law of war (or law of nations).  In Ex Parte 
Quirin the Supreme Court declared: “The law of war, like civil law, has a great 
lex non scripta, its own common law.  This ‘common law of war’ is a 
centuries-old body of largely unwritten rules and principles of international 
law which governs the behavior of both soldiers and civilians during time of 
war.”200  This statement seems to indicate that this “common law of war” is 
international law.  Even if it is the law of the United States, its content is that 
of international law.201 
Providing material support and conspiracy are defined in the 2009 MCA as 
offenses triable by military commissions,202 and one might argue that Congress 
can do so under its Article I power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against 
the Law of Nations . . . .”203  Here again, the question is whether Congress can 
define any offense it pleases as an offense against the law of war, or whether 
its power is limited to offenses that are recognized under international law.  
The drafters of the Constitution certainly viewed the “Law of Nations” as a 
real body of law that was international in character. 
Even if Congress could call offenses that are unknown to international 
law—such as “providing material support for terrorism”—violations of the 
“U.S. common law of war,” it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally 
authorize military commissions to try them.  Certainly it would be contrary to 
the United States’ long history of leadership in developing and assuring 
compliance with international humanitarian law to accept the position that the 
 
2012.  Wells Bennett, Oral Argument Recap in Hamdan, LAWFARE BLOG (May 4, 2012, 1:21 
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/oral-argument-recap-in-hamdan/. 
 198. See Brief for the United States at 22, Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257 (D.C. Cir. 
Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Hamdan-
Brief-for-US-As-Filed.pdf. 
 199. See id. at 22–23.  The Government was not willing to concede altogether that the act 
does not also violate the law of nations.  See id. at 51–55. 
 200. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S 1, 13–14 (1942) (Argument for Respondent) (citation omitted). 
 201. In Hamdan the Court said that the UCMJ requires military commissions to comply “not 
only with the American common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself, . . . and 
with the ‘rules and precepts of the law of nations . . . .’”  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
 202. 10 U.S.C. § 950t (25), (29) (Supp. IV 2011). 
 203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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law of nations is whatever the U.S. Congress and President feel like saying it 
is. 
The 2009 MCA seems to incorporate the Bush Administration view that all 
hostile acts committed by “unprivileged belligerents” are war crimes.204  But 
under international law, the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
belligerency is simply that lawful belligerents have combatant immunity and 
are not subject to prosecution under domestic law.205  Unlawful—more 
precisely, “unprivileged”—belligerents have no such immunity and may be 
prosecuted for offenses such as murder and attempted murder.206  But attacks 
using conventional weapons on military targets such as soldiers are not 
violations of the law of war.207  Indeed, while U.S. combat troops remained in 
Iraq, insurgents who planted roadside bombs were arrested and tried before the 
Central Criminal Court of Iraq.208  Following similar logic, military judges 
have dismissed charges of “murder in violation of the law of war” against 
several detainees.209 
The Preliminary Task Force Report and Attorney General Holder’s 
designation of five detainees for criminal prosecution and five for military 
commissions also imply that the Administration’s view is that the primary 
dividing line between offenses triable by military commissions and criminal 
offenses is that an attack on a military target is triable before a military 
commission.210  Thus al-Nashiri was charged before a military commission for 
the attack on the U.S.S. Cole,211 and Omar Khadr212 and Mohammed Jawad 
were charged before a military commission for attacks on U.S. soldiers in 
 
 204. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(7), 950t (Supp. IV 2011).  The Obama Administration apparently 
agrees; the very first military commission trial during the Obama presidency was that of Omar 
Khadr, charged with throwing a grenade at American soldiers and killing one.  See Times Topics: 
Omar Khadr, supra note 54. 
 205. See Government’s Motion, supra note 196, at 1–2. 
 206. See id. 
 207. Defense Response, supra note 196, at 1–4, 9. 
 208. Am. Forces Press Serv., Iraq’s Central Criminal Court Convicts Insurgents, U.S. DEP’T 
DEF. (Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=25603. 
 209. Proposals for Reform of the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 104 (2009) (statement of David J.R. Frakt, Lead Defense Counsel, Office of Military 
Commissions) (noting that three military commissions considering the cases of Salim Hamdan, 
Ali Hamza al-Bahlul, and Mohammad Jawad rejected the idea that “murder in violation of the 
law of war” included all murders committed by an unlawful combatant). 
 210. Preliminary Report, supra note 190, at 4 (noting the factors for determining whether an 
offense is triable before a military commission); The Guantanamo Trials, supra note 191. 
 211. See Richey, supra note 125. 
 212. Savage, U.S. Is Wary, supra note 152. 
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Afghanistan.213  In contrast, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, charged with the 9/11 
attacks on civilians, was designated for criminal trial (until funding restrictions 
made such a trial impossible),214 and Ahmed Ghailani, charged with the 
embassy bombings,215 and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “Underwear 
Bomber,”216 were charged and tried in federal court.217  This distinction has it 
backward: attacks on civilian populations (“protected persons”) are violations 
of the law of war, as are attacks by prohibited weapons, but attacks on military 
targets are not violations of the law of war even if they are carried out by 
unprivileged belligerents.218  They may, of course, be crimes under ordinary 
domestic law, triable in regular domestic courts. 
Only one detainee, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, has been charged with an 
actual violation of the law of war: a charge of perfidy in connection with the 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole.219  For al-Nashiri to have been guilty of perfidy 
(feigning civilian or non-combatant status220), however, the United States 
would have had to have been at war with al Qaeda in 2000.221  Neither 
Congress nor President Clinton referred to the attack as an act of war at the 
time, however, and it was treated by both military and civilian authorities as a 
criminal act, not a war crime.222 
The other two “preconditions” for trial by military commission, as stated 
by the Hamdan plurality, are that the offense must have occurred within the 
“theatre of war” and within the “period of war.”223  Some military commission 
charges do not meet these requirements either.  For example, al-Nashiri is 
charged with the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, an attack that occurred outside 
 
 213. See William Glaberson, Judge Orders a Detainee to Be Freed in August, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 31, 2009, at A14; Military Commissions Cases, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc. 
mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
 214. See Peter Landers, Congress Bars Gitmo Transfers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704774604576036520690885858.html. 
 215. See Weiser, supra note 105. 
 216. See Bunkley, supra note 151. 
 217. See id.; Weiser, supra note 105. 
 218. See Defense Response, supra note 196, at 2–3, 4 (pointing out that “if the law of war 
made killing combatants a crime, then war itself would be illegal”). 
 219. Charge Sheet, Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Al Nashiri, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS 3 (Sept. 28, 
2011), http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (accessed by clicking on “Abd Al 
Rahim Hussayn Al Nashiri (2),” then “Show All Case Documents,” then “Referred Charges 
Dated 09/28/2011”). 
 220. See id. 
 221. Frakt, supra note 61. 
 222. Nick Baumann, Obama Administration Fires Up the Military Commissions (Again), 
MOTHER JONES (Jan. 20, 2011), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/01/obama-administration-
fires-military-commissions-again. 
 223. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
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the theater of war (Afghanistan or Iraq), before the period of the war (the Cole 
attack occurred in 2000).224 
IV.  THE SORTING HAT 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current status of military 
commissions is that both Congress and the executive branch seem to believe 
that there are no legal standards governing the decision whether to prosecute in 
federal court, to bring charges before a military commission, or to simply 
detain indefinitely without charge.  All are seen as equally possible options, to 
be determined on a “case-by-case basis.”225  For example, Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri were both initially indicted in 
federal court.226  When Congress made it impracticable to transport them to the 
United States, the charges were dropped and they were charged before a 
military commission.227 
In May 2010 the Justice Department’s Task Force Report was released, 
and the Attorney General announced that the remaining detainees referred for 
prosecution would be assigned to three categories: prosecute in federal court, 
try before military commissions, or continue to detain without charge either in 
Guantánamo or in a maximum security prison in the United States.228  Attorney 
General Holder designated five detainees for criminal prosecution on charges 
related to the 9/11 attacks, and six for trial before military commissions.229 
The Report did not clearly enunciate the criteria by which the decision was 
made.  One criterion was evidently whether the target of the attack was 
military (trial by military commission) or civilian (criminal trial).230  The legal 
basis for this distinction is questionable.  As discussed above, military 
commissions can try only violations of the law of war, and attacks on military 
 
 224. See Baumann, supra note 222. 
 225. See Preliminary Report, supra note 190, at 5. 
 226. See Charlie Savage, Accused Qaeda Leader Arraigned in 2000 Cole Attack, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2011, at A21 [hereinafter Savage, Accused Qaeda Leader Arraigned]; Savage, In a 
Reversal, supra note 116. 
 227. See Savage, Accused Qaeda Leader Arraigned, supra note 226; Savage, In a Reversal, 
supra note 116. 
 228. FINAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 11. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 20 (considering “the nature of the offenses to be 
charged; the identity of the victims; the location of the crime; the context in which the defendant 
was apprehended; and the manner in which the case was investigated and by which investigative 
agency” to determine the proper forum); Preliminary Report, supra note 190, at 4 (noting that 
“the identity of the victims of the offense” was one of the factors considered in determining 
forum).  For example, the Task Force announced that the September 11th attackers would be tried 
in federal court, while the U.S.S. Cole bomber and others captured abroad for acts against soldiers 
or other military targets would be tried before military commission.  FINAL REPORT, supra note 
139, at 21. 
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targets are not violations of the law of war, whereas attacks on civilians can be.  
So if anything, the detainees were designated to the wrong tribunals. 
More deeply troubling is the apparent assumption that the government can 
choose the level of due process it provides based on whether is has enough 
admissible evidence to obtain a conviction.  According to the Report, the 
decision is to be made “case by case,” based in part on “evidentiary issues” and 
“the extent to which the forum would permit a full presentation of the 
accused’s wrongful conduct”231—an apparent reference to the possibility that 
certain evidence would be inadmissible in federal court.  As former military 
commission chief prosecutor Morris Davis wrote, “The evidence likely to clear 
the [evidentiary] high bar gets gold medal justice: a traditional trial in our 
federal courts.  The evidence unable to clear the federal court standard is 
forced to settle for a military commission trial . . . .”232  In other words, if there 
is strong and admissible evidence, prosecute in federal court.  If, on the other 
hand, evidence obtained by coercion would be inadmissible in federal court, 
use a military commission.  And if a person cannot be convicted even under 
the lower standards of a military commission, why, we can just hold him in a 
cell in Guantánamo or a maximum security prison without bothering to charge 
or try him at all.233  Attorney General Holder has consistently attempted to 
bring all charges in federal court,234 but he lent credibility to this view when, 
asked by the Senate Judiciary Committee what would happen if Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed were acquitted, he replied, “Failure is not an option.”235 
Moreover, the government has recently suggested that even if a defendant 
is acquitted by a military commission, he will still be held indefinitely as an 
unlawful belligerent;236 and similarly, if he is convicted and completes his 
sentence, he also may be held indefinitely.237  In other words, even if a 
 
 231. Preliminary Report, supra note 190, at 4. 
 232. Morris Davis, Opinion, Justice and Guantanamo Bay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at 
A21. 
 233. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 22–23 (explaining that some detainees cannot be 
prosecuted in any forum because “[w]hile the intelligence about them may be accurate and 
reliable, that intelligence, for various reasons, may not be admissible evidence or sufficient to 
satisfy a criminal burden of proof in either a military commission or federal court. . . . [also] [i]n 
many cases . . . the Task Force did not find evidence that the detainee participated in a specific 
terrorist plot.  The lack of such evidence can pose obstacles to pursuing a prosecution in either 
federal court or a military commission.”). 
 234. See id. at 20 (noting a “presumption that prosecution will be pursued in a federal court 
wherever feasible”). 
 235. Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 16 (2009) (statement of Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 236. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 237. See, e.g., Koring, supra note 56 (describing how Omar Khadr was being held at 
Guantánamo past his transfer date despite a plea deal providing he was only to remain there for 
one more year). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1148 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1115 
defendant wins acquittal in this system, which is stacked against him, it will 
make no difference—he may still face a lifetime of imprisonment at 
Guantánamo. 
Such a system is completely contrary to the rule of law.  And it is at odds 
with the law as it exists.  As the Obama Administration has recognized, 
existing law defines what kinds of offenses can be tried by military 
commissions.238  Only violations of the laws of war—war crimes—can be tried 
by law-of-war military commissions, not ordinary crimes under domestic law 
such as murder or providing material support to terrorism.  Additionally, 
executive detention without trial has historically been considered foreign to the 
American system of government; in fact, the core purpose of the writ of habeas 
corpus was to prevent executive detention without trial.239 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, military commissions in this incarnation are not “of 
necessity.”240  Their proponents have insisted on them on the grounds that 
regular trials “won’t work” because evidence obtained by coercion or torture is 
inadmissible, juries are unpredictable, regular trials aren’t harsh enough, or 
criminal trials dignify terrorists too much by affording them the same rights as 
citizens.  Such claims lack a rational basis.  Hundreds of terrorism-related 
criminal convictions have been obtained in federal court, including well-
known cases against John Walker Lindh,241 Zacharias Moussaoui,242 Richard 
Reid,243 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,244 and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani.245  
Contrary to fear mongering over the supposed impossibility of bringing 
successful prosecutions in federal court because of difficulties with classified 
information, befuddled juries, or terrorist-sympathizing judges, from 2001 to 
 
 238. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 901, 1011–12 (2012) (“By its very design, [the Suspension] [C]lause rejects the 
idea that where the privilege has not been suspended, the liberty interests that traditionally find 
enforcement in its remedy could be balanced against governmental interests in preserving 
national security.”). 
 240. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624 (2006) (“The military commission was not born 
of a desire to dispense a more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial; it 
developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed when courts-martial lacked 
jurisdiction over either the accused or the subject matter.”), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 241. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 242. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 243. United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 619–20 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 244. Monica Davey, Would-Be Plane Bomber Pleads Guilty, Ending Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 2011, at A17. 
 245.  United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying 
Ghailani’s motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial). 
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2009, the Justice Department has brought roughly 828 terrorism-related 
prosecutions in federal court, obtaining 523 convictions.246  Three hundred 
forty-six prosecutions have been brought under core terrorism statutes, or 
because of national security violation or hostage taking.247  Of the 223 such 
prosecutions that had been resolved as of 2009, 174, or 78%, resulted in 
conviction on terrorism or national security charges.248  An additional twenty-
four, or 10.8%, resulted in conviction on lesser charges.249  Thus, for that 
group, the overall conviction rate was 88.8%.250  There was no need to invent 
and litigate new procedures in these cases. 
Unfortunately, Congress has taken the rare step of using the spending 
power to thwart presidential policies concerning military affairs and criminal 
prosecutions, and it does not appear that the situation will change in the 
foreseeable future.  Thus, the only prosecutions of individuals now held at 
Guantánamo will be before military commissions, and there may be a couple 
of dozen of those (though as in the past, most of these may be resolved through 
plea agreements).251  The Obama Administration intends to hold another forty-
six people in indefinite detention there,252 and because of the difficulty of 
releasing detainees to the United States or other countries, most of the eighty-
nine current detainees who have been determined by the military not to be a 
danger to the United States will probably continue to be held at Guantánamo 
without charge.253 
The numbers of new detainees subject to military commissions, however, 
will probably be negligible, at least so long as President Obama is in office.  
Unlike the previous Administration, the current one is not kidnapping people 
off the streets in Germany, Italy, or Indonesia and bringing them to 
 
 246. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.lawandsecur 
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 247. Id. at 3–4. 
 248. Id. at 4. 
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 253. Id. 
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Guantánamo.  The American combat role in Afghanistan and Iraq is winding 
down and new prisoners captured there are being held by those countries’ 
forces rather than by American forces.  Plans are being made to turn detainees 
now in U.S. custody in Afghanistan over to the Afghan government (though 
that process has been slowed by the difficulty in assuring that they will be 
treated humanely).254  John Brennan, President Obama’s chief terrorism 
adviser, has repeatedly declared that the Administration will not bring any 
more prisoners to Guantánamo.255  Noncitizens captured outside the United 
States can, like Ahmed Warsame,256 be brought directly to the United States 
for prosecution, as the 2012 NDAA only limits transfers of noncitizens held at 
Guantánamo.257  And persons taken into custody within the United States can 
still be prosecuted in federal court. 
The announcement of Majid Khan’s plea bargain only a week after charges 
were filed258 suggests that in the near term the Obama Administration will be 
concentrating on the military commissions of the five 9/11 conspirators, 
particularly that of Khalid Shiekh Mohammed.  Commission proceedings 
involving other detainees will likely be used primarily as they were with Majid 
Khan—to strike plea bargains to obtain testimony against the five primary 
defendants.  By the time those trials are completed, the political situation may 
have changed, one way or another. 
Regardless of what happens in the near term, however,259 a significant 
number of military commission proceedings will continue, whether by full trial 
or by plea bargains, and these will remain in violation of multilateral treaties, 
customary international law, and U.S. law.  Critically, these proceedings will 
stand as a precedent for any future president who wishes to avoid the rule of 
law in combating terrorism or whatever threat to national security appears so 
new and so dangerous that it justifies extralegal means to counteract. 
Moreover, the Obama policy of restraint is, for the most part, simply that; 
with the exception of the changes in military commission procedures contained 
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in the 2009 MCA, the changes from Bush Administration practices are 
contained only in signing statements, policy statements from the President and 
members of his Administration, or at most are embodied in executive orders.  
All of these are subject to unilateral change by his successors.  Similarly, while 
President Obama has withdrawn and repudiated the legal opinions of the Bush 
Office of Legal Counsel and has scrupulously avoided basing any assertions of 
presidential power in detainee matters on his Article II powers, he has not even 
issued an executive order renouncing such an interpretation.  A future 
president could thus reassert the extreme constitutional claims of the Bush 
Administration without even having to issue a new formal executive order. 
On the other hand, the limitations on presidential ability to prosecute 
detainees in federal court, release them to other countries, or transfer them to 
facilities within the United States for detention or to serve their sentences are 
contained in statutes and thus will apply regardless of who is president.  These 
include the mandatory military detention provisions of the 2012 NDAA.260  
Indeed, the Feinstein amendment to the 2012 NDAA, designed in part to meet 
objections to mandating military custody or trial of U.S. citizens, could well 
turn out to support that very outcome.261  The compromise, which helped to 
secure passage of the 2012 NDAA without a provision for mandatory military 
custody or trial, is worded simply to state that the statute does not change 
“existing law.”  Many argued at the time—apparently supported by a phrase in 
Hamdi—that existing law already permits treating U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents who are determined to be “enemy combatants” or unprivileged 
belligerents exactly the same as foreign nationals, even if they are taken into 
custody inside the United States.  If in the future the Supreme Court, the D.C. 
Circuit, or another federal circuit, so holds, then the trial, detention, and waiver 
provisions of the 2012 NDAA will apply equally to U.S. citizens. 
Thus, because Congress has frustrated the executive branch’s efforts to 
bring the treatment of suspected terrorists back to fundamental principles of the 
rule of law and the Obama Administration has abandoned as futile any attempt 
to secure legislation to make the changes permanent, the military 
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